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Abstract—The normal operation of power system relies on
accurate state estimation that faithfully reflects the physical
aspects of the electrical power grids. However, recent research
shows that carefully synthesized false-data injection attacks can
bypass the security system and introduce arbitrary errors to state
estimates. In this paper, we use graphical methods to study de-
fending mechanisms against false-data injection attacks on power
system state estimation. By securing carefully selected meter
measurements, no false data injection attack can be launched
to compromise any set of state variables. We characterize the
optimal protection problem, which protects the state variables
with minimum number of measurements, as a variant Steiner
tree problem in a graph. Based on the graphical characterization,
we propose both exact and reduced-complexity approximation
algorithms. In particular, we show that the proposed tree-
pruning based approximation algorithm significantly reduces
computational complexity, while yielding negligible performance
degradation compared with the optimal algorithms. The advan-
tageous performance of the proposed defending mechanisms is
verified in IEEE standard power system testcases.
Index Terms—False-data injection attack, power system state
estimation, smart grid security, graph algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations and summary of contributions
THE current power systems are continuously monitoredand controlled by EMS/SCADA (Energy Management
System and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) sys-
tems in order to maintain the operating conditions in a normal
and secure state [1]. In particular, the SCADA host at the
control center processes the received meter measurements
using a state estimator, which filters the incorrect data and
derives the optimal estimate of the system states. These state
estimates will then be passed on to all the EMS application
functions, such as optimal power flow, etc, to control the
physical aspects of the electrical power grids.
However, the integrity of state estimation is under mounting
threat as we gradually transform the current electricity infras-
tructures to future smart power grids, which are more open
to the outside networks from the extensive use of internet-
based protocols in the communication system. In particular,
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enterprise networks and even individual users are allowed to
connect to the power network information infrastructure to
facilitate data sharing [2]. With these entry points introduced
to the power system, potential complex and collaborating
malicious attacks are brought in as well. Liu et al. [3] showed
that a new false-data injection attack could circumvent bad
data detection (BDD) in today’s SCADA system and introduce
arbitrary errors to state estimates without being detected. Such
an attack is referred to as an undetectable false-data injection
attack. A recent experiment in [4] demonstrates that the attack
can cause a state-of-the-art EMS/SCADA state estimator to
produce a bias of more than 50% of the nominal value without
triggering the BDD alarm. Biased estimates could directly lead
to serious social and economical consequences. For instance,
[5]–[7] showed that attackers equipped with data injection can
manipulate the electricity price in power market. Worse still,
[8] warned that the attack can even cause regional blackout.
Being aware of its imminent threats to power system, a
number of studies are devoted to both understanding its attack-
ing patterns and providing effective countermeasures [9]–[11].
A common approach to mitigate false-data injection attack
is to secure meter measurements by, for example, guards,
video monitoring, or tamper-proof communication systems,
to evade malicious injections [12]–[14]. Recent studies have
proposed a number of methods to select meter measurements
for protection. For instance, [12] proved that it is necessary
and sufficient to protect a set of basic measurements so that
no undetectable false-data injection attack can be launched.
However, the protection scheme in [12] is costly in that the
size of a set of basic measurements is the same as the number
of unknown state variables in the state estimation problem,
which could be up to several hundred in a large-scale power
system. Under limited budget, the system operator should
protect a subset of state variables. This is because an ill-
advised protection method may leave the attackers the chance
to formulate undetectable attack to compromise a large number
of, if not all the state variables, even if many measurements
have been secured [15]. In this case, the system operator may
give priority to protecting the state variables that have greater
social/economic impact once compromised, such as those
for critical buses/substations connected to heavily loaded or
economically important areas, or with critical interconnection
purposes [16]–[18]. On the other hand, even if the system
operator has enough budget to defend all the state variables,
protecting a set of basic measurements in a random sequence
may still open to attackers the possibility to compromise a
large number of state variables during the lengthy security
installation period. In both cases, it is valuable to devise
2a method that gives priority to defending a subset of state
variables that serves our best interests at the current stage,
and opens to the possibility of expanding the set of protected
state variables in the future.
In this paper, we focus on using graphical methods to derive
efficient strategies that defend any subset of state variables
with minimum number of secure measurements. Our detailed
contributions are listed as follows,
• We derive conditions to select a set of meter measure-
ments, so that no undetectable attack can be launched
to compromise a given set of state variables if the se-
lected meters are secured. The conditions are particularly
useful in formulating the optimal protection problem that
defends the state variables with a minimum cost.
• We characterize the optimal protection problem as a
variant Steiner tree problem in a graph. Then, two exact
solution methods are proposed, including a Steiner vertex
enumeration algorithm and a mixed integer linear pro-
gramming (MILP) formulation derived from a network
flow model. In particular, the proposed MILP formulation
reduces the computational complexity by exploiting the
graphical structure of the optimal solution.
• To tackle the intractability of the problem, we also pro-
pose a polynomial-time tree-pruning heuristic (TPH) al-
gorithm. With a proper parameter, simulation results show
that it yields close-to-optimal solution, while significantly
reducing the computational complexity. For instance, the
TPH solves a problem of a 300-bus testcase in seconds,
which may take days by the MILP formulation.
The proposed MILP and TPH algorithms can also be extended
to achieve incremental protection. That is, starting from a set
of protected state variables and measurements, the method
can gradually expand the set of protected state variables until
the entire set of state estimates is protected. The incremental
protection method can be used to plan a long-term security
upgrade project in a large-scale power system.
B. Related works
State estimation protection is closely related to the concept
of power network observability. The conventional power net-
work observability analysis studies whether a unique estimate
of all unknown state variables can be determined from the
measurements [1]. From the attacker’s perspective, [3] proved
that an undetectable attack can be formulated if removing the
measurements it compromises will make the power system
unobservable. Conversely, [12] showed that no undetectable at-
tack can be formulated if the power system is observable from
the protected meter measurements. In this paper, we extend
the conventional wisdom of power network observability to a
generalized state variable observability to study the protection
mechanisms for any set of state variables.
Graphical method is commonly used for power system
observability analysis. The early work by Krumpholz et al.
[19] stated that a power system is observable if and only if it
contains a spanning tree that satisfies certain measurement-to-
transmission-line mapping rules. A follow-up work presented
a max-flow method to find such mapping to examine the
observability of a power network [20]. Few recent papers
also applied graphical methods to study the attack/defending
mechanisms of false-data injection. For instance, based on
the results in [19], [21] proposed an algorithm to quantify
the minimum-effort undetectable attack, i.e. the non-trivial
attack that compromises least number of meters without being
detected. Besides, [22] used a min-cut relaxation method to
calculate the security indices defined in [23] to quantify the
resistance of meter measurements in the presence of injection
attack. Similar min-cut approach was also applied in [24] to
identify the critical points in the measurement set, the loss of
which would render the power system unobservable.
The problem of defending a subset of critical state variables
against undetectable attack was first studied in our earlier work
[15], where we proposed an arithmetic greedy algorithm which
finds the minimum set of protected meter measurements by
gradually expanding the set of secure state variables. However,
the computational complexity of the greedy algorithm can be
prohibitively high in large scale power systems. For instance,
it may take years to obtain a solution in a 57-bus system. In
contrast, we study in this paper the optimal protection from a
graphical perspective. By exploiting the graphical structures of
the optimal solution, the proposed MILP formulation obtains
the optimal solution with significantly reduced complexity. In
addition, we also propose a pruning-based heuristic that yields
near-optimal solutions in polynomial time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce some preliminaries about state estimation
and false-data injection attack. We characterize the optimal
protection problem in a graph in Section III and propose
solution algorithms in Section IV. In Section V, we discuss the
methods to extend the proposed algorithms to some practical
scenarios, including the method to achieve incremental protec-
tion. Simulation results are presented in Section VI. Finally,
the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. DC measurement model and state estimation
We consider the linearized power network state estimation
problem in a steady-state power system with n+1 buses. The
states of the power system include the bus voltage phase angles
and voltage magnitudes. The voltage magnitudes can often be
directly measured, while the values of phase angles need to
be obtained from state estimation [25]. In the linearized (DC)
measurement model, we assume the knowledge of voltage
magnitudes at all buses (1 in the per-unit system) and estimate
the phase angles based on the active power measurements, i.e.
the active power flows along the power lines and active power
injections at buses [1]. By choosing an arbitrary bus as the
reference with zero phase angle, the network state consisting
of the n unknown voltage phase angles is captured in a vector
θ = (θ1, θ2, .., θn)
′
. In the DC measurement model, the m
received measurements z = (z1, z2, .., zm)′ are related to the
network states as
z = Hθ + e. (1)
Here, H is the measurement Jacobian matrix [1]. e ∼
N (0,R) is independent measurement noise with covariance
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Fig. 1. Measurement placement of an example 5-bus system.
R. Using a 5-bus power system in Fig. 1 for example. By
setting bus 1 as the reference bus, there are four unknown
state variables. Suppose that the reactance of all transmission
lines equals 1, the measurement Jacobian matrix is
H =


−1 0 0 0
1 0 −1 0
0 −1 0 1
0 0 1 −1
−1 2 0 −1
−1 0 2 −1


, (2)
where the first 4 rows correspond to flow measurements while
the last two rows correspond to injection measurements. The
four columns correspond to bus 2 to 5, respectively. Notice that
the column corresponding to the reference bus is not included.
When H is full column rank, i.e. rank (H) = n, the
maximum likelihood estimate θˆ is given by
θˆ =
(
H
T
R
−1
H
)−1
H
T
R
−1
z , Pz. (3)
Since rank (H) ≤ m, i.e. the number of rows in H, at least n
meters are needed to derive a unique state estimation. Mean-
while, the other m−n measurements provide the redundancy
to improve the resistance against random errors.
Errors could be introduced due to various reasons, such
as device misconfiguration and malicious attacks. The current
power systems use BDD mechanism to remove the bad data
assuming that the errors are random and unstructured. It
calculates the residual r = z−Hθˆ and compares its l2-norm
with a prescribed threshold τ . A measurement z is identified
as a bad data measurement if
r = ||z −Hθˆ|| = || (I−HP) e|| > τ, (4)
where I is an identity matrix. Otherwise, z is considered as a
normal measurement.
B. Undetectable attacks and protection model
Suppose that attackers inject malicious data a =
(a1, a2, .., am)
′ into measurements. Then, the received mea-
surements become
z˜ = Hθ + e+ a. (5)
In general, a is likely to be identified by the BDD if it is
unstructured. Nevertheless, it is found in [3] that some well-
structured injections, such as those with a = Hc, can bypass
BDD. Here c = (c1, c2, .., cn)′ is a random vector. This can
be verified by calculating the residual in (5), where
r˜ = ||z˜−HPz˜|| = ||z+ a−H(θˆ + c)|| = ||z−Hθˆ||. (6)
The same residual is obtained as if no malicious data were
injected. Therefore, a structured attack a = Hc will not be
detected by BDD. In this case, the system operator would
mistake θˆ+ c for a valid estimate, and thus an error vector c
has been introduced without being detected.
The risks of undetectable attacks can be mitigated if the
system operator can secure measurements to evade malicious
injections. Within this context, we assume that the system
operator’s objective is to ensure that no undetectable attack
can be formulated to compromise a given set of state variables
D ⊆ I, where I is the set of all unknown state estimates. That
is, ci = 0 for all i ∈ D. This is achieved by securing a set of
meter measurements P ⊆ M, where M is the set of all the
meters. In other words, attackers are not able to inject false
data to any protected meter measurement, i.e. ai = 0, ∀i ∈ P .
From [15], securing a set of meters P would eliminate the
possibility of undetectable attack to compromise a set of state
variables D, if and only if
rank
(
H{P},∗
)
= rank
(
H{P},{I\D}
)
+ |D|. (7)
Here, H{P},∗ is the submatrix of H including the rows that
correspond to P and H{P},{I\D} is the submatrix of H{P},∗
excluding the columns that correspond to D. |D| denotes the
size of D. Naturally, we are interested in minimizing the cost
to protect the state variables D. For simplicity, we assume a
fixed cost, e.g. manpower or surveillance installation cost, of
securing each meter for the time being. This requires solving
the following problem
minimize
P⊆M
|P|
subject to rank (H{P},∗) = rank (H{P},{I\D})+ |D|,
(8)
which is proved to be an NP-hard problem in the next section.
III. GRAPHICAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF OPTIMAL
STATE VARIABLE PROTECTION
Interestingly, we show that (8) can be characterized as a
variant Steiner tree problem in a graph. The results will be
used in the next section to develop graphical algorithms.
A. Network observability and state variable protection
In this subsection, we first introduce some definitions to
characterize a power network in a graph. Then, we establish
the equivalence between power network observability and
state estimate protection criterion. The results will be used
in the next subsection to formulate an equivalent graphical
characterization of the optimal state protection problem in (8).
A power network can be described in an undirected graph,
where vertices and edges represent buses and transmission
lines, respectively. We use e(h)i and e
(t)
i to denote the two
vertices connected to the edge ei, and Nj to denote the set of
edges incident to vertex vj . The following Definition 1 gives
the notion of measurability in a power network.
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Fig. 2. A measurement placement for the IEEE 14-bus testcase.
Definition 1: (measurability) The measured subnetwork
of a meter r, denoted by G¯ (r), consists of the vertices and
edges measured by the meter r. That is, for a flow meter
r on transmission line ei, G¯ (r) includes the two vertices{
e
(h)
i , e
(t)
i
}
and edge ei. For an injection meter r at bus
vj , G¯ (r) includes the vertex set
{
e
(h)
i , e
(t)
i | ei ∈ Nj
}
and
edge set {ei | ei ∈ Nj}. The measured subnetwork of a set of
meters M¯ ⊆M is defined as
G¯(M¯) :=
⋃
r∈M¯
G¯(r). (9)
In particular, G¯ (M) is referred to as the measured full
network.
Using a 14-bus testcase in Fig. 2 for example. The measured
subnetwork of the flow meter r6 includes edge e10 and vertices
v5 and v6, i.e.
G¯ (r6) = ({v5, v6} , {e10}) . (10)
The measured subnetwork of the injection meter r12 is
G¯ (r12) = ({v1, v2, v5} , {e1, e2}) . (11)
Besides, the measured subnetwork of M¯ = {r6, r12} is
G¯
(
M¯
)
= ({v1, v2, v5, v6} , {e1, e2, e10}) . (12)
The conventional power network observability analysis
studies whether a unique estimate of all unknown state vari-
ables can be determined [1]. Here, we extend the concept of
network observability to a generalized state variable observ-
ability in the following Definition 2. With a bit abuse of nota-
tion, we use a set of vertices V ′ to denote the corresponding
state variables.
Definition 2: (observability) A set of state variables D ⊆ I
is observable from a set of meters P ⊆ M, if and only if a
unique estimate of D can be obtained from the measurements
P . That is, for two different vectors θ¯ 6= θ˙, if
H{P},∗ · θ¯ = H{P},∗ · θ˙ = zP (13)
holds for an arbitrary measurement vector zP , then
θ¯k = θ˙k, ∀k ∈ D. (14)
Likewise, a measured subnetwork G¯ (P) = (V ′, E ′) is an
observable subnetwork if and only if all the unknown state
variables S in the subnetwork is observable from P , i.e.
rank
(
H{P},{S}
)
= |S|, (15)
where S = V ′ \R, with R being the reference bus.
Remark 1: It holds that |P| ≥ |D| if D is observable from
P . We refer to P as a basic measurement set of D, if D is
observable from P and |P| = |D|. Notice that not all D’s
have a basic measurement set. From (15), P contains at least
a basic measurement set of V ′ when G¯ (P) is an observable
subnetwork. Besides, G¯ must include the reference bus R,
i.e. R ∈ V ′, since otherwise rank
(
H{P},{S}
)
< |S|. Note
that the conventional definition of network observability is a
special case with D = I and P =M.
Now, we are ready to establish the equivalence between
state observability and state estimate protection criterion.
Theorem 1: Protecting a set of meter measurements P can
defend a set of state variables D against undetectable attack,
if and only if D is observable from P .
Proof: We first prove the if part. When D is observable from
P , there must exist an observable subnetwork G¯
(
P¯
)
=
(
V¯ , E¯
)
that includes D, i.e. D ⊆ V¯ and P¯ ⊆ P . From (15), we
have rank
(
H{P¯},{S¯}
)
= |S¯|, where S¯ = V¯ \ R. Then, the
solution of c to H{P¯},∗c = 0 is c =
(
0, cI\S¯
)⊺
, where cI\S¯
is an arbitrary vector. That is, no undetectable attack can be
formulated to compromise S¯ if P¯ is well protected. Since
D ⊆ S¯ and P¯ ⊆ P , this completes the proof of the if part.
We then show the only if part. That is, there exists an
undetectable attack to compromise D if D is unobservable
from P . From Definition 2, there exists a zP and two different
state vectors θ¯ and θ˙, satisfying
zP = H{P},∗θ¯ = H{P},∗θ˙ (16)
and θ¯k 6= θ˙k for some k ∈ D. By letting c = θ¯ − θ˙, we
have H{P},∗c = 0 and ck 6= 0. In other words, an attacker
can introduce non-trivial error ck to state variable k ∈ D
without the need to compromise any protected meter in P .
Therefore, an undetectable attack a = Hc can compromise
state θk without being detected. 
Remark 2: Theorem 1 indeed provides an equivalent
condition as (7) in protecting a set of state variables from
the perspective of network observability. This will help to
develop graphical algorithms in the following subsections.
From Theorem 1, we see that all the unknown state variables to
be defended, i.e. D, are included in an observable subnetwork
constructed from a set of protected meters. In the following
subsection, we find that the optimal observable subnetwork
has an interesting Steiner tree structure.
B. Graphical equivalence of optimal protection
The power network observability analysis in [19] showed a
connection between network observability and a spanning tree
structure. The idea is briefly covered in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The measured full network G¯ (M) = (V , E)
is observable if and only if the graph defined on G¯ contains a
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spanning tree, where each edge of which is mapped to a meter
according to the following rules,
1) an edge is mapped to a flow meter placed on it, if any;
2) an edge without a flow meter is mapped to an injection
meter that measures it;
3) different edges are mapped to different meters in M.
Proof: See the proof in [19]. 
Proposition 1 states that any basic measurement set of V
can be mapped to a spanning tree in the measured full graph.
On the other hand, a measured subnetwork G¯ (P) =
(
V¯, E¯
)
,
where P ⊆ M, can also be considered as a closed network
whose observability is only related to the components within
G¯ (P). Therefore, there also exists a measurement-to-edge
mapping in an observable subnetwork, specified as following.
Corollary 1: A measured subnetwork G¯ (P) =
(
V¯ , E¯
)
is
observable if and only if the graph defined on G¯ (P) contains
a tree that connects all vertices in V¯ , where each edge of the
tree is one-to-one mapped to a unique meter in P that takes
its measurement.
Proof: The proof follows by replacing M with P in
Proposition 1. 
From Remark 2 and Corollary 1, we see that the unknown
state variables to be defended are indeed contained in a tree
constructed from a protected meter measurement set. There-
fore, we propose the following minimum measured Steiner tree
(MMST) problem in a graph that is equivalent to the optimal
state protection problem (8).
MMST problem: Given the measured full graph G¯ (M) =
(V , E). To protect a set of state variables D with a minimum
cost, the MMST problem finds a shortest Steiner tree T ∗ =
(V∗, E∗) (with the minimum number of edges) and a set of
meters P∗ ⊆M that satisfy the following conditions.
1) V∗ is the set of all vertices measured by P∗;
2) D ⊂ V∗ and R ∈ V∗;
3) each edge in E∗ is one-to-one mapped to a unique meter
in P∗ that takes its measurement.
Then, the set of meters P∗ is the optimal solution to (8).
We name the problem as a Steiner tree problem, instead of
spanning tree, because T ∗ in general connects only a subset
of vertices in the measured full graph. The three conditions
ensure that all the unknown state variables in T ∗, including
D, are observable from P∗. We present an example from Fig.
2 to illustrate the structure of a MMST. We assume that D =
{v8, v12} and v1 is the reference bus. The optimal protected
meters set P∗ = {r1, r3, r4, r6, r8, r10, r12, r18} is obtained
from exhaustive search. The corresponding minimum Steiner
tree T ∗ is plotted in Fig. 3. We see that conditions 1) and 2)
are clearly satisfied. Condition 3 is satisfied by mapping edges
e2 and e12 to injection meters r12 and r18, and the other edges
in E∗ to the flow measurements placed on them.
We show that the MMST problem is NP-hard by consider-
ing a special case where flow meters are installed at all edges
of G¯ (M) = (V , E). Then, any Steiner trees that include R and
D automatically satisfy the three conditions, i.e. by mapping
each edge to the corresponding flow meter. In this case, the
MMST problem becomes a standard minimum Steiner tree
(MST) problem, which finds the shortest subtree of the full
graph that connects R and all the vertices in D. MST is a
well-known NP-hard problem. The time complexity of known
exact algorithms increase exponentially with |D| or |I| − |D|
[26]. Since MST is a special case of the MMST problem,
the MMST problem is also NP-hard following the reduction
lemma for computational complexity analysis. A special case
of the MMST problem with D = I is solved in [19] and
[20] with time complexity O (|V||E|). The special case is
easy because V∗ = V holds automatically when all the state
estimates are to be protected. The general MMST problem is
much harder due to the combinatorial nature of possible V∗.
IV. GRAPHICAL METHODS FOR OPTIMAL PROTECTION
In this section, we first introduce two exact solution methods
to solve the MMST problem, including the SVE method
and an MILP formulation. Then, a tree pruning heuristic is
proposed to obtain an approximate solution in polynomial
time.
A. Steiner vertex enumeration algorithm
A vertex v in the Steiner tree solution T ∗ = (V∗, E∗)
is a terminal if v ∈ D ∪ R, or a Steiner vertex otherwise.
The Steiner vertex enumeration (SVE) method enumerates the
possible Steiner vertices V0 until a minimum observable sub-
network, including V0 and the terminals, is found. Then, P∗
can be obtained by removing redundant measurements in the
subnetwork using Gauss-Jordan elimination. A pseudo-code
of the SVE is presented in Algorithm 1. The time complexity
of SVE is O
(
2|I|−|D|
)
, which is computational infeasible in
large scale power networks, e.g. a 118-bus system. Therefore,
we mainly use SVE as the performance benchmark to evaluate
the correctness of the algorithms proposed in the following
subsections.
Algorithm 1: Steiner vertex enumeration algorithm
input : I,D,M, R
output: Minimum protected measurements P∗ to defend D
1 repeat
2 Enumerate a set of Steiner vertices V0 ⊆ {I \ D}, from
size |V0| = 0 to |I| − |D|. Let S¯ = D ∪ V0;
3 Find the meters P¯ that measure only the buses in S¯ ∪ R;
4 until rank
(
H{P¯},{S¯}
)
= |S¯|;
5 P∗ = a basic measurement set of S¯;
B. Mixed integer linear programming formulation
In this subsection, we propose an MILP formulation to solve
the MMST problem, which has much lower complexity than
6SVE by exploiting the optimal solution structure. Consider a
digraph −→G = (V ,A) constructed by replacing each edge in
the measured full graph G¯ (M) = (V , E) with two arcs in
opposite directions. We set the reference bus as the root and
allocate one unit of demand to each vertex in D. Commodities
are sent from the root to the vertices in D through some arcs.
Then, the vertices in D are connected to R via the used arcs
if and only if all the demand is satisfied. When we require
using the minimum number of arcs to deliver the commodity,
the used arcs will form a directed tree, referred to as a
Steiner arborescence. Evidently, the solution to the MMST
problem can be obtained if we solve the following minimum
measured Steiner arborescence (MMSA) problem and neglect
the orientations of the arcs. Without causing confusions, we
say an arc (i, j) is measured by a meter if the edge [i, j] in
G¯ (M) is measured by the meter.
MMSA problem: Given a digraph −→G = (V ,A), find the
shortest arborescence −→T ∗ = (V∗,A∗) and a set of meters
P∗ ⊆M that satisfy the following conditions
1) V∗ is the set of all vertices measured by P∗;
2) D ⊂ V∗ and R ∈ V∗;
3) each arc in A∗ is one-to-one mapped to a unique meter
in P∗ that takes its measurement.
From condition 1), if an arc in −→T ∗ is mapped to an injection
meter, all the vertices measured by the injection meter must
also be included in the arborescence like the terminals, as if
an extra demand is allocated at these vertices. To distinguish
from the actual demand at D, we refer to the extra demand
induced by the use of injection meters as pseudo demand.
Then, the MMSA problem is to satisfy both the actual and
pseudo demand using minimum number of arcs.
For an arc (i, j) ∈ A, let xij be a binary variable with xij =
1 indicating that the arc is included in −→T ∗ and 0 otherwise. yij
denotes the total amount of commodity through (i, j). zij be a
binary variable with zij = 1 indicating that the injection meter
at vertex i is mapped to arc (i, j) or (j, i), and 0 otherwise.
Then, an MILP formulation of the MMSA problem is
min
X,Y,Z
∑
(i,j)∈A
xij +
1
w
∑
(i,j)∈A
zij (17a)
s. t. xij ≥
yij
w
, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (17b)
1E(i, j) + zij + zji ≥ xij , ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (17c)∑
(i,j)∈A
zij ≤ 1V (i), ∀i ∈ V (17d)
∑
(i,j)∈A
yij −
∑
(j,k)∈A
yjk = d(j), ∀j ∈ V \R (17e)
xij , zij ∈ {0, 1} , yij ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ A. (17f)
Here, w is chosen as a large positive number such that w >∑
(i,j)∈A zij and w > yij always hold. 1E(i, j) and 1V (i) are
two binary indicator functions, where 1E(i, j) = 1 if a flow
meter is available at edge [i, j] and 1V (i) = 1 if an injection
meter is available at vi. d(j) is the demand at vertex j, where
d(j) =
{
1 +
∑
(j,k)∈A zjk +
∑
[k,j]∈E
∑
(k,s)∈A zks j ∈ D∑
(j,k)∈A zjk +
∑
[k,j]∈E
∑
(k,s)∈A zks j /∈ D.
For j /∈ D, d(j) is the total pseudo demand. Otherwise, one
extra unit of actual demand is counted as well.
As we can see, there are two terms in (17a), each corre-
sponding to one objective. The first term is to minimize the
total number of arcs included in the arborescence. The second
term is to minimize the number of injection measurements.
Notice that the first objective is primary, as the second term
in (17a) is always dominated by the first one due to the
scaling factor 1/w, which makes the second term always less
than 1. As such, (17a) is to minimize the total number of
arcs in the arborescence, and meanwhile eliminating redundant
injection measurements, such as the case when two injection
measurements are assigned to the same arc. Constraint (17b)
forces arc (i, j) to be included in −→T ∗ if any commodity flow
passes through (i, j). Constraint (17c) and (17d) ensure that
each arc (i, j) included in −→T ∗ has at least one measurement
assigned to it and each injection measurement can only be
assigned to at most one arc. The flow conservative constraint
(17e), together with (17b), forces the selected arcs to form an
arborescence rooted at the reference vertex and spanning all
vertices with positive demand. Once the optimal solution to
(17) is obtained, we can restore the optimal solution P∗ to the
MMST problem by including:
1) injection measurement on bus i if zij = 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ A;
2) flow measurement on arc (i, j), if xij = 1 and zij =
zji = 0, ∀ (i, j) ∈ A. That is, the arcs in
−→
T ∗ not mapped
to any injection measurement.
Extensive experiments in the simulation section show that
the MILP formulation always obtains the same optimal solu-
tion as the SVE algorithm. Besides, the MILP significantly
reduces the computational complexity by exploiting the so-
lution structure. For instance, a problem in a 57-bus system
that is computationally infeasible by the SVE algorithm can
now be solved by the MILP within minutes. Nonetheless, the
computational complexity of the state-of-art MILP algorithms,
such as branch and bound and cutting-plane method, etc, still
grows exponentially with the problem size. We observe from
simulations that it takes excessively long time to solve the
problem in a 300-bus power system.
C. Tree pruning heuristic
To tackle the intractability of the problem, we propose a
tree-pruning based heuristic (TPH) that finds an approximate
solution in polynomial time. We refer to a tree T =
(
V¯ , E¯
)
,
along with a set of measurement P¯ , a feasible measured tree
if T and P¯ satisfy the conditions of the MMST problem. Our
observation is that, although it is hard to find a MMST, it
is relatively “easy” to find a feasible tree that includes all the
vertices in the graph using the techniques in [19]. Starting from
a feasible measured tree that spans all vertices in the measured
full graph, our TPH method iteratively prunes away redundant
vertices and updates the feasible tree, until a shortest possible
tree is obtained. A pseudo-code is provided in Algorithm 2.
The TPH consists of multiple rounds of pruning operations.
Here, we explain one round of pruning, which corresponds to
line 2-8 in the pseudo-code, in the following 4 steps.
7Algorithm 2: Tree pruning heuristic algorithm
input : G¯ (M) = (V, E), D, R, K
output: Minimum protected measurements P∗ to defend D
1 initialization: V¯ = V;
2 repeat
3 Let W = |V¯ |. Find K basic measurement sets of V¯ ,
denoted by P¯k, k = 1, .., K. For each P¯k, construct a
feasible measured trees Tk;
4 for each Tk do
5 Starting from R to all leaf vertices, find the largest
prunable subset C∗s (i) for each vi. Update Tk =
Tk \ {C
∗
s (i) ∪D(C
∗
s (i))} until each vertex in Tk is
either processed or pruned;
6 end
7 Select the minimum trees T ∗ and update V¯ by letting V¯ =
the vertices in T ∗;
8 until W = |T ∗|;
9 P∗ = the remaining measurements corresponding to T ∗;
Step 1: Feasible tree generation. For a set of vertices V¯
(initially set to be V), we generate K feasible edge-measured
trees that span all the vertices in V¯ , where K is a tunable
parameter (lines 3-4). In this step, we first find the meters that
measure only the vertices in V¯ . This can be easily performed
by examining in H whether all the non-zero elements in a row
lie in the columns corresponding to the state variable set V¯ \R.
For instance, for V¯ = {v1, v2, v4, v5} and R = v1 in Fig. 1,
the selected meters are {r1, r2, r4, r6}. Among the selected
meters, we find K basic measurement sets of V¯ \R, denoted
by P¯k (k = 1, ..,K), using Gauss-Jordan elimination. Then,
we construct K feasible spanning trees, one for each P¯k, using
the max-flow method given in the Appendix. The K feasible
spanning trees are denoted by Tk =
(
V¯ , E¯k
)
, k = 1, ..,K .
Step 2: Vertex identification. For each tree Tk, we identify
the child and descendant vertices of each vertex (included in
line 5-6 in Algorithm 2). This can be achieved by constructing
a directed tree from the root to all leaf vertices. If there is an
arc (i, j), we say vj is a child of vi, denoted by vj ∈ C (i).
In general, if there exists a path from vi to vj , we refer to vj
as a descendent of vi, denoted by vj ∈ D(i). In Fig. 4, for
instance, v6 and v7 are the child vertices of v4, while v6 to v13
are all descendent vertices of v4. In practice, the descendent
vertex identification can be achieved using breadth-first-search
starting from the root.
Step 3: Tree pruning. For each Tk, we start from the root
to the leaf vertices to prune away redundant vertices (line 5-6
in Algorithm 2). For a vertex vi, we find the largest prunable
subset C∗s (i) ⊆ C(i), such that the residual tree is still a feasi-
ble measured tree after all the vertices in {Cs(i)∪D(Cs(i))}
are pruned. In particular, {Cs(i) ∪ D(Cs(i))} can be pruned
if:
1) {Cs(i) ∪D(Cs(i))} contains no terminal vertex,
2) the deletion of {Cs(i) ∪ D(Cs(i))} will remove all
the edges mapped to injection meters that measure any
vertex in {Cs(i) ∪D(Cs(i))}.
This is because the first condition ensures the all the state
variables to be protected is still included in the tree. The
second condition guarantees that the vertices in the residual
tree are only measured by the remaining measurements. The
two conditions ensure that the residual tree is feasible to the
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Fig. 4. A measured feasible tree. {v1, v5, v8} are the terminals and v1 is
the reference. Two marked edges ([4, 6] and [9, 11]) are mapped to injection
meters and the other unmarked edges are mapped to flow meters.
MMST problem. Then, we update Tk by removing all the
vertices in {C∗s (i)∪D(C∗s (i))} and proceed to another vertex
until each vertex in V¯ is either checked or pruned.
Step 4: Vertex update. Let |Tk| be the number of remaining
vertices in Tk. Then, we select among the K trees the one
with minimum vertices, denoted by T ∗. If |T ∗| = |V¯ |, i.e.
no vertex is removed for all the K trees, we terminate the
algorithm and output P∗ as the remaining meters in T ∗ (line
7-9). Otherwise, we first update V¯ as the remaining vertices
in T ∗ and start another round of pruning from Step 1).
In Fig. 4, we present an example to illustrate the TPH, where
a feasible tree contains 12 vertices is presented. Starting from
the root v1, among the three child vertices of v1, only v2
can be pruned, since the descendent vertices of either v3 or
v4 contain terminal vertex. After pruning v2, we proceed to
check v3, whose only child vertex v5 is a terminal. Then, we
check v4, where neither of its child vertices v6 and v7 can be
pruned separately or together. On one hand, this is because v6
contains terminal as its descendent vertices. On the other hand,
the removal of v7 does not remove the edge [4, 6], which is
mapped to the injection meter at v6 that measures v7. For v7,
however, all of its descendent vertices can be pruned following
the two pruning conditions. Up to now, we have finished the
first round of pruning. Then, we use the remaining vertices
{v1, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8} to generate new feasible trees, if any,
and repeat the pruning operations iteratively until no vertex can
be further pruned.
The purpose of introducing the parameter K is because
the final output P∗ is closely related to the tree’s topology
obtained in Step 1. Intuitively, with larger K , we have a
larger chance to obtain a smaller |P∗| but also consume more
computations. The proper choice of K will be discussed in
Simulations. The correctness of TPH is obvious from the
following facts: 1) the K residual trees are always feasible
measured tree; 2) the size of the minimum residual tree is
non-increasing during the iterations; 3) |P∗| equals the size
of the minimum residual tree. There are at most |I| − |D|
rounds of pruning. In each round, K trees are pruned and
each takes O
(
|I|3
)
time complexity, dominated by the Gauss-
Jordan elimination computation. The overall time complexity
is O
(
K|I|4
)
, which is considered efficient even for very large
scale power systems.
8V. DISCUSSIONS OF APPLICATION ENVIRONMENTS
In this section, we discuss the possibility of extending the
proposed algorithms to some interesting application scenarios.
The topics we consider include: the integration of phasor mea-
surement units (PMUs) into state estimation, the applicability
to AC state estimation model and the extension to achieve
incremental state variable protection. Interestingly, we find that
our proposed algorithms can fit in all the considered scenarios
with minor modifications.
A. Integration with phasor measurement unit
Recently, the introduction of more sophisticated measure-
ment components has largely improved the accuracy and
reliability of state estimation. One such device is the phasor
measurement unit (PMU). Combined with GPS technology,
PMUs can provide direct real-time voltage phasor measure-
ment, i.e. voltage amplitude and phase angle,1 with high
precision and short measurement periodic time [27]. In other
words, any bus with a PMU installed does not need to estimate
its voltage phasor if the device has a credible precision. There
have been a number of studies on the PMU deployment
to improve power network observability [9], [16]. However,
although the introduction of PMUs can be dated back to
the 1980s, its deployment had been in a slow pace until the
past decade when a series of severe blackout experienced all
around the world [28]. Nowadays, the available PMUs alone
are still not sufficient to guarantee the observability of entire
power network. In practice, we need to rely on the mixed
measurements provided by both PMUs and the conventional
SCADA system to derive the state estimates [29].
Interestingly, our proposed algorithms can be easily ex-
tended to protect state estimation when PMUs are used. Note
that the state variable of a tagged bus cannot be compromised
by attacks if a secured PMU is installed at the bus.2 This
is equivalent to installing a secured flow meter between the
tagged bus and the reference bus. If there exists no such power
line connecting the two buses, a pseudo transmission line can
be added to facilitate the calculation of the MMST problem.
Then, the proposed protection algorithms can be directly
applied to solve the MMST problem. The only modification
needed is that injection meters cannot be mapped to a dashed
edge in the Steiner tree solution, because they do not measure
the dashed edges in real system. The modification can be easily
made in the constraints on zij in the MILP formulation (17)
by defining zij = 0 if a dashed edge eij is made up by a PMU.
For the TPH, the pruning rules need slight modification due to
the change of mapping rule of injection meters in the presence
of PMUs. The details are omitted here to avoid the repetition
of presentations.
We provide an illustrative example in Fig. 5, where a graph
is extracted from a 7-bus power network. Bus 1 is the reference
1There also exists other type of PMUs that can provide current phasors of
all the incident branches besides bus voltage phasors. We do not include them
into consideration in this paper because they are inconsistent with our notion
of a “measurement”, which provides only one reading at a time. However,
we consider this problem as a future work.
2PMU is normally required to be installed at the reference bus to avoid the
confusions due to the absolute voltage phasor measurements.
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Fig. 5. Integration of PMUs in state estimation protection.
bus and PMUs are available at bus 1 and 5. The solid edges are
the actual transmission lines in the power network. The dashed
edge connecting bus 1 and 5 is made up by the PMU at bus
5, where a pseudo-flow meter of random direction is placed
on edge e15. As discussed above, in any Steiner tree solution,
the injection meter at bus 5 cannot be mapped to the dashed
edge e15 made up by the PMU. Since now we have formulated
an equivalent problem with only power flows/injections as the
measurements, the proposed tree construction algorithms in
Section IV can be directly applied. Suppose that the state
variable of bus 7 is to be protected, a Steiner tree can be
constructed by edges {e15, e57}, which are mapped to the
pseudo-flow meter on edge e15 (from the PMU at bus 5) and
the flow meter on edge e57, respectively. Then, bus 7 can be
defended if the PMU at bus 5 and the flow meter on e57 are
protected.
B. Application to AC state estimation protection
Unlike the linear DC power flow model, the measurement
functions of AC power flow model consist of non-linear
and coupled active and reactive power flow measurements.
Meanwhile, the voltage amplitudes are also considered as the
state variables in AC power flow model. Specifically, the active
and reactive power flows on a power line connecting bus i and
j are functions are
Pij = V
2
i · gij − ViVj [gij cos(θi − θj) + bij sin(θi − θj)]
Qij = −V
2
i · bij + ViVj [bij cos(θi − θj)− gij sin(θi − θj)] ,(18)
where Vi is the voltage amplitude at bus i, gij and bij are the
conductance and susceptance of the power line (neglecting
the shunt elements). Besides, the injection measurements at
a bus are merely the sum of power flows in the incident
branches. The AC state estimation is commonly performed
in an iterative manner using the Newton’s method [1]. False-
data injection attack to AC state estimation is much harder
than to the DC counter part. On one hand, both the active
and reactive flows measurements need to be compromised. On
the other hand, the attacker also needs to know the estimated
values of state variables to calculate the attack parameter [30].
This basically requires the knowledge of all the real-time
measurement readings.
Despite the apparent differences, we find that the proposed
algorithms can still be applied to protect AC state estimation if
9the attackers only compromise voltage phase angle variables as
in the DC model. In particular, the proposed methods remain
both valid and optimal (for exact algorithms) in protecting
state variables in AC state estimation. From the attackers’
perspective, given V ′i s are constant (assumed untouched by
attackers), we notice that the power flow measurements in
(18) are only determined by phase angles differences, which
is the same as in DC power flow model. For example, suppose
that an attacker wants to perform an undetectable attack
to compromise the phase angle variable of bus 5 in Fig.
5 (we assume the meters measure both active and reactive
flows/injections and the PMUs are removed), by introducing
the same error c to the phase angle variables of bus 4 to
7. From (18), the attacker does not need to compromise the
flow meters on e56 and e57, and the injection meter at bus
5. However, it is necessary for the attacker to compromise
the readings of the boundary meters, i.e. the flow meters on
edge e14 and e34, and the injection meter on bus 3. The
compromised measurements will result in a biased estimate
produced by the system operator’s AC state estimator when the
system is observable, i.e. the AC state estimation converges to
a unique solution under any set of consistent measurements. In
general, the attacker needs to find a cut that separates a tagged
bus k and the reference bus, introducing the same error c to
the subgraph that contains the bus k and zero error to buses
in the other subgraph that contains the reference bus. Then,
the attacker only needs to compromise the meters, either flow
or injection meters, which measure the buses on boundary.
Conversely, if a minimum measured Steiner tree is con-
structed by edges mapped to secured meter measurements
from the reference to bus k, no undetectable attack can be
performed. This is because any attack formulation by cut
will require the attacker to compromise at least one secured
meter measurement. Therefore, our proposed method for DC
state estimation model remains valid and optimal in AC
state estimation model. However, if attackers also compromise
voltage amplitude state variables, our methods may still be
valid but no longer optimal. This is because the readings
of flow meters are now determined by the absolute values,
rather than the difference of voltage amplitudes. More detailed
analysis in AC state estimation protection will be considered
as a future working direction.
C. Extension to incremental state variable protection
Another interesting extension of the proposed algorithms
is to achieve incremental protection. Eventually, the system
operator may want to protect all the state variables in the
power system. However, due to the temporary limited budget
and lengthy security installation time in a large scale power
network, we may only be able to install security devices on a
set of meters to protect a subset of state variables first. Later,
we can extend the coverage to protect the other state variables
given the already protected meters, until all state variables are
protected. In fact, our proposed algorithms can be extended to
achieve such incremental protection. The intuitive idea is to
“grow” a new feasible tree on top of the existing feasible tree
to reaches more vertices to be protected.
Suppose that a set of state variables D1 has been defended
by protecting a set of meters P1. A feasible tree T1 can
therefore be constructed using the maximum-flow technique
introduced in the Appendix. By doing so, we also obtain the
mapping between the measurement and edges. Assume that
we want to extend the coverage to defend another set of state
variables D2, i.e. D1
⋂
D2 = ∅, given the protected meters
P1. Notice that the choice of D1,D2, ... can be made arbitrary
by the system operator. Intuitively, we need to find minimum
number of edges, as well as the mapped meter measurements,
to connect the vertices in D2 to the current feasible tree T1.
For the MILP formulation in (17), we can first add to the
constraints xij = 1 and zij = 1 for those edges and injection
meter in the existing feasible tree T1. That is, xij = 1 if edge
eij is included in T1; zij = 1 if the injection meter at bus vi
is mapped to the edge eij . Then, a new minimum measured
Steiner tree (MMST) as well as the new meter set P2 to be
protected can be calculated using the optimization in (17).
This can be achieved by a simple replacement of D with D2,
i.e. deliver one unit of demand to each vertex in D2. Similar
calculations can be performed to defend D3, D4, · · · , until
all the state variables are protected. For the TPH, we merely
need to add several new policies to make sure that the MMST
generated in the previous iteration to defend the variable set
Di−1 remain intact in the current iteration to defend another
variable set Di. The detailed pruning policies are omitted here
due to the scope of this paper. Notice that the number of meters
needed to protect all the state variables equals to the number
of state variables, i.e. the size of a basic measurement set as
introduced in [12], since we always keep a feasible tree whose
edge is one-to-one mapped to a secured meter measurement.
Before leaving this session, we want to emphasize that all
the proposed algorithms can be built on top of the existing state
estimation application in EMS/SCADA. This is because the
proposed algorithms merely find out a minimum set of meter
measurements to be protected without altering the algorithm
of state estimation or BDD. Besides, the calculation of the
proposed algorithms can be done offline, independent of real-
time measurements.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the proposed
defending mechanisms. All the computations are solved in
MATLAB on a computer with an Intel Core2 Duo 3.00-
GHz CPU and 4 GB of memory. In particular, MatlabBGL
package is used to solve some of the graphical problems [31],
such as maximum-flow calculation, etc. Besides, Gurobi is
used to solve MILP problems [32]. The power systems we
considered are IEEE 14-bus, 57-bus and 118-bus testcases,
whose topologies are obtained from MATPOWER [33] and
summarized in Table I. All the systems are observable with the
respective measurement placement. For illustration purpose, a
measurements placement of the 14-bus system is plotted in
Fig. 2. The measurement placements for 57-bus and 118-bus
systems are omitted for the simplicity of expositions.
We first verify the correctness of the MILP formulation to
solve the optimal state variable protection problem. This is
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TABLE I
STATISTICS OF DIFFERENT POWER SYSTEM TESTCASES
No. of buses 14-bus 57-bus 118-bus
No. of lines 20 80 186
Total no. of measurements 19 80 180
No. of inject measurements 8 30 70
No. of flow measurements 11 50 110
No. of unmeasured lines 2 2 7
TABLE II
HIT RATIO OF MILP FORMULATION IN 14-BUS TESTCASE
|D| 1 2 4 7 10
Measurement set 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Measurement set 2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Measurement set 3 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
achieved by comparing the solutions of MILP against those
of SVE algorithm in a 14-bus system. The reason we use
the 14-bus testcase is because the SVE algorithm becomes
computational infeasible in a larger power network, such as
57-bus testcase. Besides the measurement placement in Fig.
2, two other measurement placements in the 14-bus testcase
are used as well, given that the power network is observable
from all the measurement placements. We select k of the 13
unknown state variables (bus 1 being the reference bus) as D to
test each measurement placement, where k = {1, 2, 4, 7, 10}.
For each k, 20 randomly selected D’s are tested using MILP
formulation. Each entry in Table II is the percentage (hit ratio)
that the MILP formulation yields the same number of meters
as the optimal solution obtained by the SVE algorithm. We see
that MILP formulation obtains the optimal solution for all the
experiments. This, together with extensive other simulations,
verifies the correctness of MILP formulation in solving the
optimal protection problem.
We then evaluate the computational complexity of TPH in
Fig. 6, where MILP is the benchmark for comparison. For
TPH, we set the parameter K = 1 and record the total
number of vertices that are checked to produce a solution.
For MILP, we record the number of nodes explored in the
search tree by the branch-and-bound algorithm. Both numbers
are the iterations consumed by the two methods to obtain
a solution. Besides, we also record the CPU time for both
methods. The results in Fig. 6 are the average performance
of 50 independent experiments. Without loss of generality, we
randomly generate a D with size |D| = 4 in each experiment.
In Fig. 6a, we show the average number of iterations for 14-
bus, 57-bus and 118-bus systems, respectively. We find that the
iteration numbers are very close for both methods in the 14-
bus system, where TPH consumes 38 iterations and the MILP
consumes 47 iterations to obtain a solution. However, the
difference becomes more and more significant as the network
size increases. The number of iterations of TPH increases by
11 times as the network size increases from 14 to 118 buses. In
vivid contrast, the iteration number of MILP increases rapidly
by 2272 times, from merely 47 to 106787. Similar results are
also observed for the CPU time, where TPH takes only 0.485
second to obtain a solution in 118-bus system, while MILP
consumes around 5 minutes, which is 1410 times slower than
in the 14-bus system. The booming computational complexity
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF TPH AND MILP IN 57-BUS TESTCASE
|D| 1 4 9 19 29 39 49
|P|, K = 1 11.8 22.2 30.3 39.5 46.3 51.6 55.8
|P|, K = 3 10.7 20.8 28.0 37.0 43.0 48.8 54.1
|P|, K = 5 9.9 20.4 27.8 36.7 42.5 47.9 53.7
|P|, K = 10 9.7 20.2 27.3 36.3 42.1 47.6 53.1
|P|, K = 15 9.4 20.0 26.8 35.9 41.7 47.3 52.8
MILP (|P∗|) 8.8 18.2 25.4 34.6 40.7 46.2 51.8
Gap 0.6 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.0
Fig. 6. Comparison of computational complexity for MILP and TPH. (a)
The figure above shows the average number of iterations to obtain a solution;
(b) the figure below shows the average CPU time to obtain a solution.
of the MILP method is due to the NP-harness of solving an
MILP. It is foreseeable that the computational complexity of
the MILP method will become extremely expensive as we
further increase the network size. For instance, the projected
CPU time of MILP to solve a problem in 300-bus system is
more than 5 days, while it takes TPH less than 2 seconds.
When protecting all the state variables, the state estimation
protection problem in [12] is a special case of ours. In
this case, the proposed SVE and TPH algorithms indeed
use the same Gauss-Jordan elimination technique proposed
in [12], thus are of the same complexity. For the proposed
MILP formulation, however, the complexity could be much
higher due to the NP-harness of solving integer programming
problems. Therefore, we do not recommend to using MILP
to solve the special case that all the state variables are to
be protected. Another point to mention is the impact of the
redundancy in measurements. On one hand, the complexity of
the MILP increases with the measurement redundancy. This is
mainly because the number of variables zij in the optimization
problem (17) will increase as the number of injection meter
increases. On the other hand, the proposed TPH is not sensitive
to measurement redundancy in the network. This is because
its complexity is O(K|I|4), independent of the number of
measurements.
We also investigate the impact of the parameter K to the
performance of TPH. By varying the values of K and |D|, we
show in Table III the average solution size |P| of TPH and
MILP. Each entry of the table is the average performance of
50 independent experiments. From the 2nd to the 6th rows, we
see that better solution, i.e. smaller |P|, is obtained with larger
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Fig. 7. Effect of K to the performance of TPH in the 57-bus system. (a)
The figure above shows the solution size of TPH normalized by the optimal
solution size obtained by MILP; (b) the figure below shows the CPU time of
TPH normalized by the CPU time when K = 1.
K . Compared with the optimal solution P∗ obtained by MILP,
TPH protects on average only 1.13 more meters when K = 15.
The optimality gap is less than 10% for all the cases. For better
visualization, we plot the ratio |P|/|P∗| for some selected
|D|’s in Fig. 7a. We notice that the ratio improves notably for
small |D| as K increases from 1 to 15. For instance, the ratio
improves from 1.32 to 1.04 for |D| = 1. The improvement
is especially notable when we change K = 1 to 3. However,
the improvement becomes marginal as we further increase K ,
such as the case with |D| = 49, where the ratio only improves
by 0.03 from K = 1 to 15. We also plot in Fig. 7b the CPU
time normalized against the time consumed when K = 1. We
observe that the CPU time increases almost linearly with K ,
which matches our analysis in Section IV. Results in Fig. 7
indicate that we should select a proper K to achieve a balance
between the quality of approximate solution and computational
complexity. In particular, a large K , such as K = 10, should
be used when |D| is small relative to n, i.e. |D| < 0.1n.
Otherwise, a small K , such as K = 3, should be used when
|D| is relatively large.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we used graphical methods to study defending
mechanisms that protect a set of state variables from false-
data injection attacks. By characterizing the optimal protection
problem into a variant Steiner tree problem, we proposed both
exact and approximate algorithms to select the minimum num-
ber measurements for system protection. The advantageous
performance of the proposed defending mechanisms has been
evaluated in IEEE standard power system testcases.
APPENDIX
MAXIMUM-FLOW METHOD FOR TREE CONSTRUCTION
We use an example in Fig. 2 to illustrate the method
to obtain a feasible spanning tree. We consider a basic
measurement set P¯ = {r1, r6, r12, r14} of V¯ \ R, where
V¯ = {v1, v2, v4, v5, v6} and R = v1. The set of edges
measured by P¯ is E¯ = {e1, e2, e5, e7, e10}. Then, a directed
graph is constructed in Fig. 8, where v1 is chosen as the
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Fig. 8. Maximum-flow method for measurement tree construction. The solid
arcs are the saturated arcs obtained in the final solution.
root to construct the spanning tree. We select in advance an
edge connected to the root, say e1, in the final tree solution.
This is achieved by setting both the lower and upper capacity
bounds of the edge to be 1. The other edges’ lower and
upper capacity bounds are set to be 0 and 1, respectively.
Then, a maximum flow is calculated from s to t. If the
problem is feasible, i.e. the flow solution is 1 in edge e1,
we obtain a measurement-to-edge mapping by observing the
saturating flows in the graph. Otherwise, we select another
edge connected to the root and recalculate the maximum flow
problem. Since V¯ is observable from P¯ , there is always a
solution. In the above example, the final measurement-to-edge
mapping is {r1, r6, r12, r14} ↔ {e1, e10, e2, e7}. Then, the
edges obtained by the maximum flow calculation will form
a tree that spans all vertices in V¯ .
REFERENCES
[1] A. Abur and A. G. Expo´sito, “Power system state estimation: theory and
implementation”. New York: Marcel Dekker, 2004.
[2] C. W. Ten, C. C. Liu and G. Manimaran. “Vulnerability assessment
of cybersecurity for SCADA systems.” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems,
vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 1836-1846, 2008.
[3] Y. Liu, P. Ning and M. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against state
estimation in electric power grids,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM
conference on computer and communications security, Chicago, Illinois,
2009, pp. 21-32.
[4] A. Teixeira, G. Dan, H. Sandberg and K. H. Johansson, “Cyber security
study of a scada energy management system: stealthy deception attacks
on the state estimator,” in IFAC World Congress, Milan, Italy, 2011.
[5] L. Jia, R. J. Thomas and L. Tong, “Impacts of malicious sata on real-time
price of electricity market operations,” 45th HICSS, pp. 1907-1914, Jan
4-7, 2012.
[6] L. Xie, Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Integrity data attacks in power market
operations,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 659-665, Dec
2011.
[7] D. H. Choi and L. Xie, “Malicious ramp-induced temporal data attack in
power market with look-ahead dispatch,” IEEE International Conference
on Smart Grid Communications, pp. 330-335, Nov 2012.
[8] Y. Yuan, Z. Li and K. Ren, “Modeling load redistribution attacks in power
systems,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol.2, no. 2, pp.382-390, June 2011.
[9] A. Giani, E. Bitar, M. Garcia, M. McQueen, P. Khargonekar and
K. Poolla, “Smart grid data integrity attacks,” IEEE Trans. on Smart
Grid, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1244-1253, Sept. 2013.
[10] G. Dan and H. Sandberg, “Stealth attacks and protection schemes for
state estimators in power systems,” IEEE International Conference on
Smart Grid Communications, pp. 214-219, Oct 2010.
[11] S. Cui, Z. Han, S. Kar, T. T. Kim, H. V. Poor and A. Tajer, “Coordinated
data-injection attack and detection in the smart grid: A detailed look at
enriching detection solutions,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 29,
no. 5, pp. 106-115, Sept 2012.
[12] R. Bobba, K. M. Rogers, Q. Wang, H. Khurana, K. Nahrstedt and
T. Overbye, “Detecting false data injection attacks on DC state estima-
tion,” in CPSWEEK 2010.
12
[13] O. Vukovic, K. .C. Sou, G. Dan and H. Sandberg, “Network-aware
mitigation of data integrity attack on power system state estimation”,
IEEE JSAC, vol. 30, no. 6, July 2012.
[14] T. T. Kim and H. V. Poor, “Stategic protection against data injection
attack on power grids”, IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 2, Jun
2011.
[15] S. Bi and Y. J. Zhang, “Defending mechanisms against false-data
injection attacks in the power system state estimation”, In Proc. of IEEE
Globecom SG-COMNETS, Houston, TX, Dec 2011.
[16] S. Chakrabarti and E. Kyriakides. “Optimal placement of phasor mea-
surement units for power system observability.” IEEE Trans. on Power
Systems, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 1433-1440, 2008.
[17] NERC, “An approach to action fot the electricity sector”, [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.iwar.org.uk/cip/resources/nerc/cip-nerc.pdf, Jun 2001.
[18] NERC, “Security guidelines for the electricity sector:
physical security - substations”, [Online]. Available:
http://www.optellios.com/pdf/secguide ps-s 1.0 BOTapprvd15oct2004
.pdf, Oct 2004.
[19] G. R. Krumpholz, K. A. Clements and P. W. Davis, “Power system
observability: a practical algorithm using network topology,” IEEE Trans.
on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-99, no.4, pp. 1534-1542, July
1980.
[20] A. Barglela, M. R. Irving and M. J. H. Sterling, “Observability determi-
nation in power system state estimation using a network flow technique”,
IEEE Trans. on Power Pystems, vol.1, no. 2, May 1986.
[21] O. Kosut, L. Jia, R. J. .Thomas and L. Tong, “Malicious data attack on
the smart grid”, IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 645-658,
2011.
[22] K. C. Sou, H. Sandberg and K. H. Johansson, “Electricity power network
security analysis via minimum cut relaxation”, 50th CDC-ECC, pp. 4054-
4059, Dec. 2011.
[23] H. Sandberg, A. Teixeira and K. H. Johansson, “On security indices for
state estimators in power networks,” in CPSWEEK 2010.
[24] K. C. Sou, H. Sandberg and K. H. Johansson, “Computing critical k-
tuples in power networks”, IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, vol. 27, no. 3,
pp. 1511-1520, 2012.
[25] J. G. Grainger and W. D. Stevenson. Jr., “Power system analysis”,
McGraw-Hill, 1994.
[26] F. K. Hwang, D. S. Richards and P. Winter, “The Steiner tree problem”,
Monograph in Annals of Discrete Mathematics, 53, Elsevier, 1992.
[27] R. Zivanovic and C. Cairns. “Implementation of PMU technology in
state estimation: an overview.” IEEE AFRICON 4th, vol. 2, 1996.
[28] A. G. Expo´sito, A. Abur, P. Rousseaux, A. de la Villa Jau´n and
C. G. Quiles, “On the use of PMUs in power system state estimation”.
In Proc. 17th Power Systems Computation Conference, pp. 22-26, 2011.
[29] N. H. Abbasy and H. M. Ismail, “A unified approach for the optimal
PMU location for power system state estimation,” IEEE Trans. on Power
Systems, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 806-813, May 2009.
[30] G. Hug and J. A. Giampapa, “Vulnerability assessment of AC state
estimation with respect to false data injection cyber-attacks,” IEEE Trans.
on Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1362-1370, Sept 2012.
[31] D. Gleich, Contents Matlab BGL v4.0, 2006. [Online]. Available:
http://www.stanford.edu/ dgleich/programs/matlab bgl/.
[32] Gurobi, [Online]. Available: http://www.gurobi.com/.
[33] R. D. Zimmerman and C. E. Murillo-Sanchez, “MATPOWER, A
MATLAB power system simulation package.” [Online] Available: http:
//www.pserc.cornell.edu/matpower/manual.pdf, Sept 2007.
Suzhi Bi (S’10-M’14) received his Ph.D. degree
in Information Engineering from The Chinese Uni-
versity of Hong Kong, Hong Kong in 2013. He
received the B.Eng. degree in communications engi-
neering from Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China,
in 2009. He is currently a research fellow in the
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
National University of Singapore, Singapore. From
June to August 2010, he was a research engineer
intern at Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R),
Singapore. He was a visiting student in the EDGE
lab of Princeton University in the summer of 2012. His current research
interests include MIMO signal processing, medium access control in wireless
networks and smart power grid communications. He is a co-recipient of Best
Paper Award of IEEE SmartGridComm 2013.
Ying Jun (Angela) Zhang (S’00-M’05-SM’11) re-
ceived her Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Electronic
Engineering from the Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology, Hong Kong in 2004. She
received a B.Eng in Electronic Engineering from
Fudan University, Shanghai, China in 2000.
Since 2005, she has been with Department of
Information Engineering, The Chinese University of
Hong Kong, where she is currently an Associate
Professor. She was with Wireless Communications
and Network Science Laboratory at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) during the summers of 2007 and 2009. Her
current research topics include resource allocation, convex and non-convex
optimization for wireless systems, stochastic optimization, cognitive networks,
MIMO systems, etc.
Prof. Zhang is an Executive Editor of IEEE Transactions on Wireless Com-
munications, an Associate Editor of IEEE Transactions on Communications,
and an Associate Editor of Wiley Security and Communications Networks
Journal. She was a Guest Editor of a Feature Topic in IEEE Communications
Magazine. She has served as a Workshop Chair of IEEE ICCC 2013 and
2014, TPC Vice-Chair of Wireless Communications Track of IEEE CCNC
2013, TPC Co-Chair of Wireless Communications Symposium of IEEE
GLOBECOM 2012, Publication Chair of IEEE TTM 2011, TPC Co-Chair
of Communication Theory Symposium of IEEE ICC 2009, Track Chair of
ICCCN 2007, and Publicity Chair of IEEE MASS 2007. She was a Co-Chair
of IEEE ComSoc Multimedia Communications Technical Committee, an
IEEE Technical Activity Board GOLD Representative, IEEE Communication
Society GOLD Coordinator, and a Member of IEEE Communication Society
Member Relations Council (MRC). She is a co-recipient of 2011 IEEE
Marconi Prize Paper Award on Wireless Communications, and a co-recipient
of Best Paper Award of IEEE SmartGridComm 2013. As the only winner from
Engineering Science, she has won the Hong Kong Young Scientist Award
2006, conferred by the Hong Kong Institution of Science.
